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The recent confirmation hearings of Robert Gates to become Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) have focused debate over the proper role for future
U.S. intelligence activities. Coming at a time when the existing world order of
the last four decades is crumbling at a free-fall pace, the hearings have raised
questions about whether an intelligence structure originally designed to confront
very different world circumstances is still relevant. Though the Cold War may
be over, the need for intelligence in shaping U.S. foreign policy will continue
unabated. Despite a far more favorable climate for the United States and its
allies, it is clear that international threats and issues remain significant. Shrink-
ing U.S. military forces may make the contribution of intelligence to U.S.
national security and foreign policy even more important. This Essay examines
how the Intelligence Community's structure should be reconsidered in light of
the changed international environment that the United States now confronts.
In 1947, Congress addressed shortcomings in the intelligence structure that
contributed to the Pearl Harbor disaster. Under the statutory regime of the
National Security Act of 1947, Congress created the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) as the preeminent U.S. government agency to receive and
interpret intelligence from all sources.' The statute also codified the position
of DCI.2 Administering the CIA is one of the DCI's key responsibilities, but
the National Security Act designated the head of the CIA as the Director of
t Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.; LD., University of Michigan Law School,
1977; B.A., Luther College (Iowa), 1974; General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1988-
90; Special Counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for Iran-Contra matters, 1987; Chief
Counsel, Congressional Affairs for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 1980-81; Special Assistant
to the Director of the FBI, 1978-81.
In 1991, the author served as a member of the DCI advisory group described in this Essay that studied
the structure of the Intelligence Community. While some of the information contained in this Essay was
derived from that study, and this Essay was reviewed by the CIA to ensure that it does not contain classified
information, the views expressed are solely those of the author.
1. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 2,63 Stat. 579 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-
405 (1988)).
2. In addition to creating the CIA and codifying the position of the DCI, the National Security Act
of 1947 also created the position of Secretary of Defense and established the current structure of the three
military departments. For a general description of the CIA's predecessors, the Office of Strategic Services,
and the Central Intelligence Group, and of the events that resulted in the enactment of the National Security
Act of 1947, see JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 37-111 (1986).
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Central Intelligence and did not limit his duties to those involving the CIA?
Instead, the DCI coordinates the intelligence activities of all of the various
agencies and entities that comprise the Intelligence Community.
Today's changing geopolitical landscape challenges the capabilities of the
agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community and the structure that binds
them together. Both congressional intelligence committees-the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence-are reviewing the Intelligence Community's structure. In early
1991, then-DCI William Webster convened an advisory group of eight former
senior officials from six Intelligence Community agencies to consider the issue.
In addition, the Secretary of Defense last year approved a proposal that would
significantly change the structure of the Intelligence Community agencies that
are part of the Department of Defense (DoD).
Part I of this Essay describes the challenges that the Intelligence Communi-
ty faces in the next decade. Part II describes the organization and function of
the Intelligence Community and the role of congressional oversight in reviewing
Intelligence Community activities. The prospect of significant changes in the
Intelligence Community's mission calls for a reexamination of existing Intelli-
gence Community structures, capabilities, and authorities.
Part III proposes procedures to effect restructuring. Most importantly, this
Essay argues that both the President and Congress should decline the "invitation
to struggle" that has marked U.S. foreign policy and national security policy
for over two hundred years. Instead, the President should initiate a cooperative
process to identify and prioritize the most likely intelligence targets of the next
decade. When that process is complete, the President should propose a structure
that will address the identified targets and accommodate the Intelligence
Community's required flexibility. Congress should then approve or reject the
proposed structure on an "up-or-down" basis. Part III also examines the pend-
ing proposal to establish the position of Director of National Intelligence and
concludes that this proposal is flawed. This Essay then advances a few propos-
als that should be considered in restructuring the Intelligence Community.
I. THE INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGE IS CHANGING
Over the last forty years, U.S. intelligence efforts have largely focused on
two concerns. The first, and clearly most important, has been the military and
political threat to the United States from the Soviet Union and its political
satellites. Significant U.S. intelligence resources have been focused on Soviet
military power, especially as a threat to European security. Eastern Europe has
3. It is a common mistake-one sometimes made even by senior government officials-to refer to the
DCI as the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency."
[Vol. 101: 867
Intelligence Community Reorganization
been a window through which Soviet capabilities and intentions have been
discerned. In addition, Soviet "adventurism" in other parts of the world has
drawn U.S. intelligence interest chiefly on the basis of implications for the
"East-West" power struggle.
The intelligence focus in other parts of the world has been primarily
political. Most intelligence activities have been aimed at discerning information
that sovereign states wish to keep secret and analyzing that information,
together with other information, for the benefit of policymakers and diplomats.
The nature of the collection and analysis may differ based on perceptions of
whether a particular country is a "friend or foe," but the focus of intelligence
activities has been on the political affairs of sovereign states. Lesser emphasis
has been given to economic or social issues.
The U.S. Intelligence Community faces different, but no less daunting,
challenges in the 1990's. Despite political reforms, Russia and the other Soviet
republics continue to control the world's second most advanced arsenal of
strategic nuclear weapons and the world's largest standing army. Economic and
political upheaval in the Soviet Union have caused a level of instability unseen
since 1918. At the same time, Soviet political and social reforms make informa-
tion from this area far more plentiful than ever before. Yet, last summer's
attempted coup 4 and reciprocating disarmament proposals 5 raise fundamental
questions of whether intelligence efforts aimed at the Soviet Union will need
to be redirected in the future, with less emphasis placed on Soviet military
issues and more on economic and social issues.
More attention will also be accorded other regions and issues during the
1990's. Eastern and Central Europe are undergoing changes that seemed
unthinkable little more than two years ago. Regional conflicts caused by
religious, ethnic, or tribal rifts, such as those taking place in Central Europe,
the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa can threaten U.S. interests.6 These
conflicts take on added importance because of the continuing proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, the U.S. Intelligence Community
of the 1990's requires a geographic breadth and depth well beyond its tradi-
tional focus.7
4. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, The Soviet Crisis; Gorbachev is Ousted in an Apparent Coup by Soviet
Armed Forces and Hard-Liners: Accused of Steering into a 'Blind Alley.' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991, at
Al.
5. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, Bush's Arms Plan; Soviets Hail US. Arms Plan and Signal Their Own
Cuts; Britain and France Join in, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1991, § 1, at 1.
6. See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The Middle East Talks: New Talks, Old Words; Rivals Unsheathe
Timeworn Swords, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at AS; Edward A. Gargan, Brutal Rebellion Pushing Northern
Sri Lanka Back to a Pre-Industrial Era, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at A3; Jane Perlez, A New Chance
for a Fractured Land, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, § 6, at 49 (describing ethnic tensions in the aftermath
of Ethiopia's coup d'etat in May 1991); John Tagliabue, Old Tribal Rivalries in Eastern Europe Pose Threat
of Infection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, § 4, at 2.
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 65, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1991) ("Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm has taught us that we can no longer afford the luxury of concentrating so much of our intelligence
resources on one possible adversary. Intelligence must have a baseline encyclopedic knowledge of the world
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The need to cover subjects beyond the traditional political and military
focus of the Intelligence Community has increased. Policymakers have now
begun to focus more intently on how economic developments affect U.S.
competitiveness in international markets.8  Furthermore, counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, technology transfer, and similar topics have been added to an
already full platter of intelligence issues. Each of these subjects has major law
enforcement components and transcends traditional political borders. Conse-
quently, the Intelligence Community cannot approach these issues with conven-
tional intelligence methods.
The Intelligence Community, however, must confront these increased
demands with shrinking resources. The intelligence budget will, at best, stay
the same for the near future, and it could be curtailed significantly as the
defense budget is cut in response to the growth of the deficit and changes in
the world. Policymakers will need to make important resource allocation
decisions, some of which could profoundly affect the organization of the
Intelligence Community, or at least the functions of some agencies.
Finally, the Intelligence Community must continue to improve coordination
with policymakers in order to help chart the course that will best serve U.S.
foreign policy interests. Because of their distinct roles, inherent tensions exist
between intelligence officers and policymakers. While separation of roles is
critical, intelligence officers must have an even greater understanding of the
policymaking process and the value of intelligence in that process. Only in this
way can intelligence remain relevant to the policymaking process. 9
from which can be distilled rapidly, information to satisfy the needs of operational commanders.").
8. The importance of economic intelligence has been addressed by a number of current and former
intelligence officials, including former DCI Stansfield Turner.
The most obvious specific impact of the new world order is that, except for Soviet nuclear
weaponry, the preeminent threat to U.S. national security now lies in the economic sphere. The
United States has turned from being a major creditor nation to the world's greatest debtor, and
there are countless industries where U.S. companies are no longer competitive. We must, then,
redefine "national security" by assigning economic strength greater prominence. That means we
will need better economic intelligence. The United States does not want to be surprised by such
worldwide developments as technological breakthroughs, new mercantilist strategies, sudden
shortages of raw materials or unfair or illegal economic practices that disadvantage the coun-
try.
Stansfield Turner, Intelligence for a New World Order, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 150, 151 (1991); see also David
L. Boren, The Winds of Change at the CIA, 101 YALE L.J. 853 (1992); William E. Colby, Intelligence in
a New World, 1 MEDrTERRANEAN Q. 46, 49-55 (1990).
9. The tension between policymaker and intelligence officer was described by Robert Gates when he
was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
The fact is that, over the years, the policymaker and the intelligence officer have consistently
(and with frighteningly few exceptions) come together hugely ignorant of the realities and
complexities of each other's worlds-process, technique, form and culture. CIA officers can
describe in excruciating detail how foreign policy is made in every country in the world save
one-the United States.
Robert M. Gates, The CIA and American Foreign Policy, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 215,219 (1987-88). As demon-
strated by Dr. Gates' recent confirmation hearings, however, intelligence agencies must be careful to
maintain objectivity and to avoid charges of "politicizing" intelligence analysis. See Nomination Hearings:




I. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Background on the Intelligence Community
Defining the Intelligence Community's structure as it exists, much less as
it should exist, is a difficult task. The Intelligence Community has little statuto-
ry basis. It is not defined, or even mentioned, in the National Security Act of
1947. The intelligence activities of the Treasury and State Departments and the
military services, as well as the counterintelligence role of the FBI, predate the
National Security Act. The formation of the CIA and the National Security
Council (NSC) in 1947 provided a framework for an Intelligence Community,
but little specificity. Even after the National Security Agency (NSA) was
organized in 1952 and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established
in 1961, the Intelligence Community structure remained ill defined.
Since 1975, however, the Intelligence Community has operated under the
guidance of a series of Executive orders dealing with intelligence activities.10
Each of these Executive orders addressed the structure of the Intelligence
Community and the activities of Intelligence Community agencies to some
extent. Executive Order 12,333, issued by President Reagan in 1981, currently
governs the Intelligence Community's structure."
Not surprisingly, the Intelligence Community's structure reflects the
diversity inherent in the various agencies' areas of concern. Some agencies,
10. President Ford issued the first such Executive order in 1975. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg.
7703 (1976). In 1977, President Carter replaced that Executive order. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg.
3674 (1978).
11. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988). The current
Executive order defines the Intelligence Community to include the following organizations:
1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
2) The National Security Agency (NSA);
3) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
4) The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign
intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
5) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State;
6) The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and, the Department of Energy; and,
7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Id. For a more thorough description of the Intelligence Community and its agencies, see Scorr D.
BRECKENRIDGE, THE CIA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYsTEM 40-53 (1986); see also James E. Meason,
Military Intelligence and the American Citizen, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541,547-54 (1989) (describing
military intelligence agencies).
12. The agencies of the Intelligence Community conduct four basic intelligence functions. (1) Collection
encompasses the gathering of information for use by policymakers. Much of the collection is from overt
sources (e.g., media sources and government reports) or through diplomatic channels. Clandestine collection
may come from human sources or by technical means such as satellites or electronic interception. (2) Analy-
sis is the processing and interpretation of collected information into finished intelligence. (3) Counterintelli-
gence involves those efforts aimed at preventing hostile foreign intelligence efforts from successfully
obtaining information that the U.S. government does not want disclosed. (4) Covert action has recently been
defined as any "activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be
apparent or acknowledged publicly." Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88,
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like the DIA, focus almost entirely on military issues, and other Intelligence
Community agencies expend significant resources on military issues. 3 Some
Intelligence Community agencies, however, consider military issues less
important and have little interaction with those gathering military intelligence.
These agencies tend to focus on political or economic issues.
Of all the agencies comprising the Intelligence Community, only the CIA
reports directly to the President and has an independent mission established by
statute. All other agencies report to one of five Cabinet secretaries and remain
responsible for departmental missions. The majority of Intelligence Community
agencies report to the Secretary of Defense. Yet each member of the Intelli-
gence Community is also accountable, to some degree, to the DCI. This tension
must be addressed in any Intelligence Community restructuring.
B. DCI Authority
The National Security Act fails to address specifically the DCI's authority
to lead and direct the Intelligence Community. The DCI's powers emanate
primarily from Executive orders, and to some extent from other Presidential
directives. Hence, the DCI's authority is subject to change and interpretation
by the President. Even if such authority were codified by statute, the effective-
ness of any particular DCI is primarily dependent on the DCI's relationship
with the President, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretaries of State
and Defense.
Probably no DCI responsibility is more important than the Executive Order
12,333's directive that the DCI "[a]ct as the primary adviser to the President
and the [National Security Council] on national foreign intelligence."' 4 In
Washington, where power is often measured more by the perception of access
than by statutory authority, the manner in which the President permits the DCI
to fulfill this responsibility is probably the paramount factor in assessing the
DCI's ability to lead the Intelligence Community. The Executive order also
provides that the DCI play a role in developing the Intelligence Community
budget and in establishing the priorities for the Intelligence Community agencies.
5
105 Stat. 429 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 415). This definition is similar, although not identical, to that
contained in Executive Order No. 12,333.
13. The budgets of Intelligence Community agencies are classified, and therefore, the specific
percentage of the budget expended on military issues is unavailable. Nevertheless, one commentator has
concluded that the "Defense Department is actually the nation's primary producer of and consumer of
intelligence information" with as much as 90% of the nation's intelligence resources under its controL
Meason, supra note 11, at 544 & n.12.
14. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 11, § 1.5(a).
15. Id. § 1.5. In addition, the Executive order charges the DCI with the following responsibilities:
[Dievelop ... objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community.... [P]romote the
development and maintenance of services of common concern. . . . [Flormulate policies
concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments
.... [EInsure the establishment.., of common security and access standards .... [Develop
programs] which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures .... [E]stablish
[Vol. 101: 867
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C. The Role of Congressional Oversight
Congress played only a limited role in the Intelligence Community structure
from the late 1940's, when it enacted the National Security Act, until the mid-
1970's. Over the last fifteen years, however, Congress has played a more active
role in overseeing the activities of the Intelligence Community. This will
undoubtedly continue as the President and Congress develop a new structure
for the Intelligence Community.
1. The Evolution of the Oversight Structure
For many years, on the rare occasions when it was exercised, congressional
oversight of the Intelligence Community was very informal.
For more than twenty-five years following the passage of the National
Security Act, which created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947,
Congress largely ignored the [I]ntelligence [C]ommunity .... It voted
for untold billions of dollars in hidden appropriations for intelligence
activities with very few, if any, of its members knowing either the
amounts or the purposes of the funds. Members of Congress who were
actively concerned about the activities of the [I]ntelligence [C]om-
munity were rebuffed by large majorities on the few occasions when
they tried to ask questions or to establish procedures for doing
SO.
16
This congressional complacency began to change in the early 1970's when
public allegations of CIA wrongdoing focused attention on the oversight issue.
Congress launched investigations by the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by
uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national
foreign intelligence .... [Hiave full responsibility for production and dissemination of national
foreign intelligence .... [E]nsure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by
national foreign intelligence collection means .... [D]evelop... the consolidated National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget.... [R]eview and approve all requests for reprogramming
... funds.... conduct program and performance audits and evaluations .... [Tiogether with
the Secretary of Defense, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign
intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs ....
Id. For a recommendation that the DCI's authority in budget matters and intelligence tasing be enhanced,
see infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
16. CECIL V. CRABB & PAT M. HOLT, INVITATION To STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT &
FOREIGN POLICY 163-64 (1989); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIEs-AN EVALUATION, A REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE 8 (1985) (before late 1970's, "a few members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
and the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had been the only
members of the legislative branch exercising legislative oversight over the intelligence agencies. There had
been no annual bills authorizing appropriations for the intelligence community, and there was no identifiable
appropriation for intelligence."); GREGORY F. TREVERTON, COVERT ACTION: THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION
IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 75 (1987) (congressional "review of covert action was informal in the extreme").
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Senator Frank Church, and by the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
chaired by Representative Otis Pike. Both committees recommended that
Congress establish permanent intelligence oversight committees.
17
In response to these recommendations, Congress established the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in 1976 and the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) the next year." Almost immediate-
ly, these two committees began actively overseeing the Intelligence Community.
Beginning with the Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1979,9 the CIA and the other Intelligence Community
agencies were subject to congressional authorization and appropriation proce-
dures similar to other government agencies.
2. Specific Reporting Requirements
The core of congressional oversight is contained in sections 501 and 502
of the National Security Act, which was amended to its present form by the
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991.10 Sections 501 and 502
17. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIvITIEs, FINAL REPORT, BOOK I, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Church Committee).
For example, the Church Committee concluded, inter alia, that its investigation:
underscores the need for an effective legislative oversight committee which has sufficient power
to [balance the] fundamental conflicts between secrecy and democracy .... [lt is the Commit-
tee's view that effective congressional oversight requires the power to authorize the budgets of
the national intelligence agencies. Without such authority, an oversight committee may find itself
in possession of important secret information but unable to act effectively to protect the
principles, integrity, and reputation of the United States.
S. REP. No. 755, at 424. See generally Kent A. Jordan, Note, The Extent of Independent Presidential
Authority to Conduct Foreign Intelligence Activities, 72 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1862-63 (1984).
18. The SSCI was established by S. Res. 400,94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 4754 (1976). The
resolution directed the committee to "oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and
programs of the United States Government, and to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation
concerning such intelligence activities and programs." Id. § 1.
The IPSCI was established by H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 22,932 (1977).
The resolution set forth the duties of the HPSCI in nearly identical terms as those contained in Senate
Resolution 400.
19. Pub. L. No. 95-370, 92 Stat. 626 (1978).
20. Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429 (1991) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413). The statute amended
§ 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 and added § 502. The Act now imposes the following reporting
requirements on the President:
(a)(1) The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed
of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence
activity as required by this title.
(b) The President shall ensure that any illegal intelligence activity is reported promptly to the
intelligence committees, as well as any corrective action that has been taken or is planned in connec-
tion with such illegal activity.
Pub. L No. 102-88.
In addition, the Act requires the DCI, heads of all departments, and entities of the U.S. government
to "keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." This section
replaced similar requirements, applicable only to the DCI, that had been enacted as part of the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980, which was passed as title V of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501, 94 Stat. 1981 (1980).
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establish broad affirmative reporting requirements, most of which fall to the
DCI. Thus, the DCI must keep the two intelligence committees "fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities" carried out by any U.S. govern-
ment agency or department, "including any significant anticipated intelligence
activity."'"
The President must also "promptly" report "any illegal intelligence activity"
and "any corrective action," and the DCI must report "any significant intelli-
gence failure." In addition, the DCI must furnish any information or material
"requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry out its
authorized responsibilities." ' These requirements, in conjunction with a gener-
al spirit of cooperation, have resulted in a voluminous flow of information from
the Intelligence Community to the oversight committees. Thus, during 1990,
the CIA alone participated in over thirty hearings, provided over 1000 briefings
to congressional committees and members, and furnished over 6000 reports and
other analytical documents to Congress.' In general, only the identity of
sources and the details of technical operations are withheld from the intelligence
committees in connection with their oversight responsibilities.'
The DCI's reporting requirements are subject to two exceptions. First, 50
U.S.C. § 413 provides that the DCI's reporting shall be "consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information
21. Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 31, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804-05 (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)).
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, first passed by Congress in 1974, made the President accountable for all
covert actions. As enacted, the amendment also required that covert actions for which a Presidential finding
is obtained be reported in a timely fashion to the appropriate committees of the Congress. In total, there
were eight congressional committees that had to be notified. In 1980, simultaneously with passage of the
Oversight Act, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was amended to reduce the reporting requirements only to
the intelligence committees, and to provide that covert actions are considered significant anticipated
intelligence activities for purposes of § 501. For a more extensive discussion of reporting requirements as
they applied to CIA covert actions under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, see Russell 3. Bruemmer &
Marshall H. Silverberg, The Impact of the Iran-Contra Matter on Congressional Oversight of the CIA, 11
Hous. . INT'L L. 219 (1988).
The Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991 added a new § 503 to the National Security Act
of 1947, which established particular requirements for the approval and reporting of covert actions for the
President and the DCI. The legislation was largely a codification of executive branch procedures established
through National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 286, issued by President Reagan in 1987. For a
description of the unclassified portions of NSDD 286, see Bruemmer & Silverberg, supra, at 235-36
(although entire document is classified, certain portions have been declassified and are on file with author).
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was explicitly repealed as part of the 1991 codification.
22. Pub. L. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429 (1991).
23. Telephone interview with CIA's Public Affairs Office, Oct. 11, 1991. This type ofinformationflow
caused then-DDCI Robert Gates to describe the CIA in 1987 as "involuntarily poised nearly equidistant
between the executive and legislative branches." Gates, supra note 9, at 225.
Covert actions, and the occasional controversy over the President's failure to report covert actions to
Congress, have been the most significant exceptions to comity between the two branches of government
on intelligence issues. Implementation of covert action is almost exclusively a CIA responsibility, see Exec.
Order No. 12,333, supra note 11, § 1.8(e), and even within the CIA, represents a very small percentage
of resources expended. Thus, the vast majority of Intelligence Community activities are reported to and
reviewed by Congress in a cooperative manner.
24. L. Britt Snider, Remarks of L. Britt Snider, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 47, 49 (1988).
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relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods."' The section on covert
action reporting specifically allows notice to be limited "[ijf the President
determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstanc-
es affecting vital interests of the United States." This provision addresses
executive branch concerns that some intelligence information is too sensitive
to share with all of the members of the two committees. As a practical matter,
however, this provision has not been used by the executive branch to limit prior
notice.
The second exception to the prior notice requirement results from the
tension between the President and the Congress over their respective constitu-
tional roles in the conduct of foreign policy.' The President undoubtedly will
continue to assert his inherent constitutional authority to withhold some infor-
mation on the conduct of intelligence activities from Congress.' He is likely
to assert that this constitutional authority can be exercised independently of any
statutory limitations.29 Congress understandably will not accept this argu-
25. 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1988). The Act explicitly states that this provision "shall [not] be construed as
authority to withhold information from the intelligence committees on the grounds that providing the
information.., would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating
to intelligence sources or methods." Id. § 413(e). This caveat leaves open the possibility that "exceptionally
sensitive matters" might be withheld from the committees.
26. Id. § 413. In such circumstances, the President may restrict notification to the "the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House
of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate." Id.
27. See generally infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. The preamble to former § 501 explicitly
referred to the "applicable authorities and duties ... conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and
legislative branches of the Government... ." 50 U.S.C. § 413(a), repealed by Intelligence Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, § 602(a)(2), 100 Stat. 429, 441. For a discussion of the
preamble's language and the resulting compromise on this issue during the enactment of the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980, see Bruemmer & Silverberg, supra note 21, at 227-28.
28. In his signing statement on the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, President Bush
said:
Several provisions in the Act requiring the disclosure of certain information to the Congress
raise constitutional concerns. These provisions cannot be construed to detract from the President's
constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which could significantly impair
foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the
performance of the Executive's constitutional duties.
Signing Statement, Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, reprinted in 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1137, 1138 (Aug. 14, 1991).
29. Cf. Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 195-96 (1980); Legal Opinion of May 9, 1980, by Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to the President
on War Powers Consultation Relative to the Iran Rescue Mission (on file with author).
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ment.30 This constitutional quandary must be considered as the President and
Congress move to restructure the Intelligence Community.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REORGANIZATION
The need for restructuring the Intelligence Community is overwhelming.
As set forth above, the Intelligence Community will face a variety of matters
that have not been within its traditional focus. A shift away from the Soviet
military/political orientation that shapes and dominates its structure will likely
be required. Any restructuring must be designed so that the Intelligence Com-
munity is left with the necessary flexibility to address the regional, economic,
and other issues of interest to the United States that were described in Part I
of this Essay.
Congress and the executive branch appear to agree that a review of the
Intelligence Community's structure is necessary. Both congressional intelligence
committees, the DCI, and the Secretary of Defense have begun efforts aimed
at restructuring the Intelligence Community. What remains to be determined
is which structure is best suited for fulfilling the U.S. government's future
intelligence needs.
30. The tension is described in the conference committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 1991
Intelligence Authorization Bill:
At the same time, however, it is the intent of the conferees that this provision be interpreted
in a manner consistent with whatever authority the Constitution may provide. If the Constitution
in fact provides the President authority to withhold notice of covert actions for longer periods,
then the conferees' interpretation cannot be legally binding upon the President. In his letter to
the committees, reprinted above, the President asserts that the Constitution, in his view does
provide such authority.
Neither committee has ever accepted this assertion. The conferees recognize that this is
a question that neither they nor the Congress itself can resolve. Congress cannot diminish by
statute powers that are granted by the Constitution. Nor can either the legislative or executive
branch authoritatively interpret the Constitution, which is the exclusive province of the judicial
branch.
JoINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT,
FISCAL YEAR 1991, REP. No. 166, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1991).
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A. Principles of the Proposal
1. Joint Action Is Preferable
An analysis of Intelligence Community reorganization must begin by noting
that neither the President nor Congress can claim sole authority on foreign
policy and national security issues. Scholars and politicians have struggled to
construct a framework for decisionmaking in these areas, but largely without
success. Instead, we are left with a situation best described by Professor
Corwin's oft-quoted observation: "[The Constitution, considered only for its
affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy. '31 Certainly
this adage retains its truth when the term "national security" is substituted for
"foreign policy."
In some areas affecting foreign policy and national security-the power to
grant or withhold diplomatic recognition and to classify and control informa-
tion-the authority of the President is generally preeminent. On the other hand,
Congress controls most funding for intelligence activities through its appropria-
tions power. In most areas, such as national security, however, the two branches
struggle for dominance, and little guidance is provided by the judiciary in
determining which branch should have the upper hand.
32
The "invitation to struggle" over national security issues should be declined
whenever possible. The ineffectiveness of the War Powers Resolution33 serves
as a vivid illustration of the unfortunate consequences that can result when the
President and Congress vehemently adhere to principle and thereby fail to reach
consensus on a national policy issue. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to find
anyone who believes that U.S. national security interests are strengthened by
the current version of the War Powers Resolution, which was passed over
President Nixon's veto in 1972, and has remained a source of conflict between
the President and Congress ever since. 34
31. EDWARD S. CORWIN ET AL, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (5th rev.
ed. 1984).
32. Professor Koh argues that the reluctance of the Supreme Court and the lower courts to intervene
in foreign policy decisionmaking takes two forms: the Court either grants the President undue deference
with respect to foreign policy decisions or refuses to hear challenges to the President's authority for lack
ofjusticiability or standing. See HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 134-49 (1990).
The former is exemplified by Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), and United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The latter is exemplified by Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(1987), and Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
33. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-
48 (1988)) (placing limits on ability of President to deploy U.S. troops into hostile situations and requiring
that President consult Congress about such deployment).
34. Criticism of the War Powers Resolution is rampant, as are proposals for correcting its failures. See,
e.g., John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379
(1988); Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers
Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (1984). One commentator after noting that neither the President, the
courts, nor Congress has complied with or enforced the War Powers provisions, concluded that "[f]or the
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A more viable model for resolving national security issues, such as restruc-
turing the Intelligence Community, is set forth in Justice Jackson's concurrence
in Youngstown Steel Co. v. Sawyer.35 The idea is expressed succinctly by
Judge Mikva: The executive branch "acts at the apex of its power... [when]
it wields the combined power of both the executive and legislative branch-
es." 36 Thus, both Congress and the President should approach Intelligence
Community restructuring with the view that neither will impose its solution for
restructuring on the other.
2. The President Should Take the Lead
Considerable energy could be wasted, and comity displaced, by arguing
over who should initiate a proposal for changing Intelligence Community
structure. Congress might view itself as leading this issue and believe that its
collective wisdom can provide the best answer to the question. Congress might
even believe that no substantial change will be effected unless it acts. Nonethe-
less, conscious of my previous argument that reorganization should be a shared
responsibility, the structure of the Intelligence Community is an issue on which
the President's views should energize the debate and should be entitled to
greater weight.
To understand why the executive branch should hold sway in this struggle,
one must appreciate that intelligence is not a good or service with an inherent,
intrinsic value. Instead, intelligence is only a tool in the process that formulates
U.S. national security and foreign policy. The task of establishing that policy
falls primarily, or at least initially, on the executive branch. As noted by one
commentator:
[I]n the United States system the executive branch as a whole is more
likely to obtain a correct understanding of international political reality.
In this area, the President's chief task is to get the accurate information
most part, the law has been treated by everyone as if it were a potted plant." Thomas M. Franck, Special
Issue: The United States Constitution in Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: Distribution of Constitutional
Authority: Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic Invocation?," 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 766,
769 (1989).
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson explained that:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum....
2. When the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 853 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva, J.); see also Dames
& Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69.
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about other nations that already exists within the executive branch into
the hands and minds of key decisionmakers before they must act.
37
To be sure, Congress has a role in forming U.S. foreign and national security
policy, but its role is more appropriately a secondary one of oversight and
review.
Recent history shows that the executive branch is most often in the position
of defining the debate and action on foreign policy issues.38 It is the President
who must be prepared to act in a crisis situation and who must have informa-
tion that requires immediate action. The President must respond to attacks on
U.S. interests and protect or rescue American citizens endangered by coups or
civil wars. The President also must be prepared to grant or withhold diplomatic
recognition to emerging governments or to withdraw recognition in appropriate
circumstances.
Intelligence is a critical tool in shaping such responses. Congress may
conduct a postmortem to determine if a given crisis was an "intelligence
failure" or if the President's foreign policy contributed to or failed to respond
adequately to the crisis. Moreover, if the situation lasts long enough, and
especially if appropriations are necessary to sustain the U.S. response, Congress
will almost certainly assert (if the President does not otherwise request) a
consultative role. Nevertheless, it is the President and the executive branch who
must act in those moments when the situation requires immediate access to
information.
Finally, as experience has demonstrated, the structure of the Intelligence
Community should have flexibility to adapt to the personal characteristics of
the President. Some Presidents have actively used intelligence. President Bush,
like President Ford did, receives daily intelligence briefings directly from the
CIA. Other Presidents, including Presidents Reagan and Carter, have generally
used their National Security Advisors to synthesize intelligence information.
In some administrations, there has been a competitive atmosphere among the
CIA, the various departments, and the National Security Council.39 In the
37. P. Edward Haley, Legislative-Executive Relations and the United States Intelligence Community,
12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495, 501 (1989).
38. After considering the structural basis on which the struggle between Congress and the President
is waged, Professor Corwin notes:
Not only is a struggle for power in this field thus invited; in the absence of a co-operative
disposition all around it is well-nigh inevitable. Nor do the applicable principles of constitutional
law help much in resolving such a quarrel.... Even so, if our diplomacy was to have a
reasonable chance of success in the world at large it had to have unity of direction from an organ
of government that was "always in session," which could act swiftly and secretly, and that
commanded the widest information; and these requirements the Presidency met.
CORWIN ET AL. supra note 31, at 255. Even those who argue that the Framers intended Congress to have
a broader role acknowledge that the President has achieved preeminence in foreign policy decisionmaking.
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284, 291-92 (1987).
39. The evolving role of the National Security Advisor and the tension between roles of the National
Security Council Staff and other intelligence departments and agencies is discussed, inter alia, in KOH, supra
note 32, at 53-57; see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, at 11-2 to IH-4 (1987)
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current administration, the model is largely one of collaboration. The Intelli-
gence Community's structure must fit these personal characteristics.
It should be apparent from these considerations that, as the primary user
of intelligence, the President's views also should be entitled to a greater, or at
least the initial, voice in how the Intelligence Community should be structured.
It is the President who will have a better understanding of how the Intelligence
Community structure will fit in with the executive branch's foreign policy-
making apparatus. The President will be held most directly accountable for any
failures caused by inefficiencies in the Intelligence Community structure.
Moreover, it is the President, in the capacity of the unitary executive, who is
more likely to be able to move quickly and consistently to propose and imple-
ment a restructuring proposal.
3. A Consensus on Reorganization Must Be Developed
Reorganization in a vacuum, or even in response to the "last war" (no
matter how recent), is likely to confuse motion with progress. A meaningful
restructuring proposal can only result from a determination of three first-order
objectives against which the Intelligence Community's success will be mea-
sured. Without general agreement about these first-order objectives, perceptions
about the success of any reorganization could vary greatly. Therefore, the
process by which these objectives are established must include the Intelligence
Community, military leadership, and Congress.
The first objective to be identified is which targets and threats the Intelli-
gence Community will monitor during the next decade. In the past, making this
determination was easy. For over forty years, the primary focus of the Intelli-
gence Community was the military and political activities of the Soviet Union
and its satellites. As explained earlier, the Intelligence Community must now
cover a broader range of issues across the globe.'
Most importantly, this review of targets and threats should look beyond the
immediate future. The annual budget cycle adequately identifies short-term
threats and allocates resources to meet them. The budget process, however, is
not geared to accommodate intelligence threats throughout the next decade.
Assessing threats in order to design tfie optimal Intelligence Community struc-
ture demands a long-range view.
The second basic objective to be determined is which priorities will be
assigned to these intelligence targets. In the past, there have always been more
intelligence targets than resources to cover them. This disparity will become
even greater in the 1990's given the intelligence requirements and budget
constraints the Intelligence Community will face. Only a clear sense of priori-
(generally called the "Tower Commission" report).
40. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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ties will enable the Intelligence Community to attack these issues in an effective
manner.
Finally, Congress and the President must reach a consensus about the level
of funding that will be available to address these prioritized targets. The current
budget system is dependent on yearly authorization and appropriation cycles.
Some multiyear funding is provided for certain projects, but intermittent
funding, or even uncertainty over funding, can seriously undermine intelligence
programs. Thus, the objective to be determined is what level of resources is
likely to be available to address the prioritized intelligence targets.
4. Piecemeal Reorganization Should be Avoided
Piecemeal solutions are not likely to provide an overall structure that will
best serve the government's long term national security interests. Instead, the
President and Congress should seek a broad-based, more lasting solution.
Nevertheless, both the Senate and the House of Representatives have recently
proposed piecemeal solutions to this complex situation. 41 The Department of
Defense has also approved a reorganization plan that addresses some, but not
all, of the issues that should be considered in restructuring the relationship
between military and nonmilitary intelligence agencies. 42 Because piecemeal
solutions are not likely to result in the most effective Intelligence Community
structure, these proposals, each of which has some merit, should be considered
as part of a more comprehensive review.
The SSCI report attempts to solve the perceived problems with the CIA's
human intelligence support to the military during Desert Storm. It requires the
CIA to create an additional Associate Deputy Director for Operations (ADDO)
specifically for military operations. The newly created ADDO would be a flag-
rank military officer who would "ensure that military requirements are fairly
represented within CIA" and would "advocate an earlier and more effective
interaction by CIA with DoD operational planners." 43 In addition, the SSCI
report requires the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) to appoint an imagery manager
to "ensure that all DoD imagery systems adhere to a common set of stan-
dards."' Exercising budget authority over the various DoD imagery compo-
nents, the imagery manager would address problems in imagery dissemination
identified by the report.
41. See S. REP. No. 117, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1991); H. REP. No. 65, supra note 7, at 4-6.
42. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), Plan for
Restructuring Defense Intelligence (Mar. 15, 1991) (unpublished, declassified government document on file
with author).




Each idea attempts to impose a solution at the top of bureaucracies that
themselves may require more fundamental changes to address the perceived
problems. For example, the CIA's intelligence collection to support the military
might be better improved by requiring a career military officer to fill one of
the two or three senior positions in the Intelligence Community 5 or by in-
creasing interagency assignments between the military intelligence services and
the CIA's divisions responsible for human intelligence collection. Similarly,
improvements in coordinating imagery collection and exploitation should be
implemented across the Intelligence Community, not just within the Defense
Department.
The SSCI's "requirements" also illustrate another basic problem. As is
often the case, significant Intelligence Community changes would be imple-
mented as part of the congressional authorization process and not in indepen-
dent legislation. Moreover, the SSCI's "requirements" are contained only in
the report accompanying the Authorization Act and not in the Authorization
Act itself. The legal and practical efficacy of such "requirements" is uncertain.
They are, of course, not "presented" to the President, nor are they subject to
presidential veto, which may run afoul of INS v. Chadha" and other similar
cases. As a practical matter, enactment through report language also limits the
debate on such matters. Robust debate not only sharpens the result, but also
enhances the legitimacy of any changes that are made.47
The House 1992 Intelligence Authorization Bill Report also advocates a
similar piecemeal approach in response to perceived weaknesses in the Intelli-
gence Community structure. The House report "recommends" the transfer of
DoD science and technology intelligence assets to the DIA and requires the
ASD/C31 to report to Congress on the status of these recommendations. 48 The
report also encourages improvements in the use of the Intelligence Community
staff19 and recommends withholding a portion of the Intelligence Community
staff's budget until the DCI submits plans to improve the staff's management
efficiency.50
The executive branch must also accept some blame on this score. The
Secretary of Defense, for instance, recently approved a reorganization plan for
DoD intelligence activities. The DoD plan consolidates responsibility for most
45. See infra Part IILB.2.
46. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative vetoes unconstitutional).
47. By "enacting" requirements through report language, Congress might be seen to have won the
"struggle" because the President cannot veto the requirement and the agencies must, as a practical matter,
follow the requirement or face the wrath of Congress. However, as one commentator has aptly commented
on Professor Corwin's "invitation to struggle" quotation: "[Tlhe objective of the struggle is not control but
wise policies acceptable to the American people." Alton Frye, Congress and President: The Balance Wheels
of American Foreign Policy, 69 YALE REV. 1, 2 (1979).
48. H. REP. No. 65, supra note 7, at 7-9.
49. The Intelligence Community staff is drawn from the Intelligence Community agencies and assists
in coordinating budget and other resource issues for the DCI. It reports directly to the DCI and is headed
by the Director of the Intelligence Community Staff.
50. H. REP. No. 65, supra note 7, at 9-11.
1992]
The Yale Law Journal
of the DoD intelligence effort in the ASD/C31, a move that was not instituted
in conjunction with any possible restructuring of the nonmilitary intelligence
agencies. The HPSCI has already criticized the reorganization plan for not
implementing a sufficiently broad restructuring.51 The Senate Armed Services
Committee also has expressed strong disagreement with the plan's shift of the
Director of DIA's reporting responsibility to the ASD/C3I. 2 While it is too
early to determine the plan's effectiveness, it is clear that the DoD reorganiza-
tion may need to be reconsidered in light of other restructuring proposals.
5. Congress Should Proceed by Up-or-Down Vote
The President might assert that any Intelligence Community reorganization
could, and should, be effected solely through Executive order or other Presiden-
tial directive. As noted above, it is the executive branch that plays the larger
role in the structure and effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. Nonethe-
less, the President and the Intelligence Community would be well served by
involving Congress in any restructuring, provided that congressional involve-
ment does not lead to unduly prolonged consideration or tinkering of the sort
that led, in part, to the demise of legislation efforts (the "Charter Legislation")
to regulate the Intelligence Community in the late 1970's.
5 3
Efforts to enact the Charter Legislation demonstrated the practical difficul-
ties in attempting to address Intelligence Community restructuring through the
traditional legislative process. The Charter Legislation would have created
statutory charters for a number of Intelligence Community agencies. Both the
Congress and the President supported this effort in principle, but after almost
four years of legislative proceedings, the Congress and the Carter Administra-
tion could not reach agreement on a comprehensive proposal for the Intelligence
Community's structure. Indeed, the Administration ended up opposing efforts
to codify many of the provisions of its own Executive order on intelligence
activities.54
Over time, there have been a number of instances in which Congress has
been willing to forego its traditional legislative role and instead approve or
reject an executive branch proposal on an "up-or-down" basis. The Executive
Reorganization Act 5 and "fast-track" approval for trade agreements5 6 are
51. Id.
52. S. REP. No. 113, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 273-75 (1991).
53. The first such bill was the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, S. 2525,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). An identical bill was H.R. 11,245, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Similar
legislation was considered in the next Congress as S. 2284,96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See generally JOHN
M. OSETH, REGULATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 122-148 (1985); Newell L. Highsmith, Note,
Policing Executive Adventurism: Congressional Oversight of Military and Paramilitary Operations, 19
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 354-64 (1982).
54. See Highsmith, supra note 53, at 357.
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1988). The Executive Reorganization Act, which was enacted in 1966,
requires the President to transmit a "reorganization plan" to Congress whenever the President determines
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two examples. However, both the Executive Reorganization Act and fast-track
agreement authority have weaknesses in certain circumstances because neither
is triggered until the President presents a proposal to Congress. Moreover, an
affirmative congressional approval is required before a presidential plan can be
implemented.
Therefore, the procedure recently used to consider and approve military
base closings provides a better model to follow. Under the Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 7 the Secretary of Defense is required
to submit to Congress a description of planned troop deployments along with
the selection criteria proposed for evaluating recommendations for closure or
realignment. Using this system, the reasoning underlying any decisions are
understood by both Congress and the executive branch before the decisions are
made. The Secretary then publishes a list of recommended closures and realign-
ments and transmits that list to a commission appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. The commission reviews the Secretary's recommenda-
tions and submits a report to the President with the commission's own recom-
mendations. If the President agrees with the Commission's recommendations,
the President transmits a report to Congress. The Secretary of Defense then
carries out the base closures recommended by the commission and approved
by the President, unless Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving the
recommendations within forty-five days of the President's transmittal. The joint
resolution is subject to expedited consideration that assures a vote on the
motion to disapprove within the forty-five day time period.
The Base Closure Act assures Congress that difficult issues will be consid-
ered, and considered in an orderly manner, using a process designed to elicit
as much information as possible. When presented with a proposal under the
Act, Congress must conduct an up-or-down vote in a short period of time. It
thus has ample opportunity to review proposals without having the time to
that "changes in the organization of agencies are necessary" to promote more effective management of the
executive branch or increase efficiency in the government. Id. § 903. The plan may provide for transfer
or consolidation of functions, and even the abolition of an agency if the functions of that agency have been
transferred to another agency.
Once transmitted, the plan proceeds on a timetable that virtually assures an up-or-down vote within
90 days. The plan is referred to the Senate Government Affairs Committee and the House Government
Operations Committee, which must consider the plan within 75 days. A resolution disapproving the plan
may then be brought up for consideration by any member of either house. Debate is limited (10 hours total),
and no amendments or reconsideration are permitted.
Under the pre-1984 version of the Executive Reorganization Act, a veto by either house would make
the President's reorganization proposal ineffective. 5 U.S.C. § 909 (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-614,
§ 3(c), 98 Stat. 3192 (1984). In 1983, however, the Supreme Court held that legislative vetoes are unconsti-
tutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In response to Chadha, Congress amended the Reorganiza-
tion Act in 1984. The amendment requires both houses to approve a reorganization proposal for it to become
effective and extends the time period for congressional action from 60 to 90 days.
56. Professor Koh offers "fast-track approval," such as that used to approve trade agreements, as a
model for foreign affairs legislation. See KOH, supra note 32, at 176. This type of procedure also might
be used to involve Congress in intelligence matters. The prime example of the fast-track model, the Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988), is procedurally similar to the Reorganization Act.
57. Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2901-2910, 104 Stat. 1808 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note).
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consider and debate up to 535 views on the subjects. Unlike the experience with
Charter Legislation, hard choices and difficult compromises will not result in
extended delay or failure.
B. Specific Proposals for Restructuring
What structure, then, should result from this process? One model, largely
a repeat of proposals that have appeared over the years, is pending in the
Senate. That proposal, which is described in the Section A of this part, has
flaws, and is unlikely to improve the functioning of the Intelligence Communi-
ty. This section describes alternative proposals to restructure the Intelligence
Community.
1. Proposal to Create a Director of National Intelligence
Over the years, a number of proposals would have created a Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) to function as the head of the Intelligence Commu-
nity and as the President's senior intelligence adviser, but who would neither
manage nor direct the CIA.58 One such proposal appeared in the Charter
Legislation.5 9 This proposal has resurfaced in a bill currently before the Senate
that would split the current DCI's responsibilities between a DNI and a Director
of the CIA, while assigning each a deputy.60 All four positions would be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
The DNI would be a member of the National Security Council and, by
statute, would be designated as "the nation's senior intelligence officer and
primary adviser to the President on foreign intelligence matters."'" While the
duties of the DNI would encompass many of the same areas covered by
Executive Order 12,333, the language used in the statute is more explicit. The
role of the Director of the CIA would be diminished accordingly. The Director
of the CIA would report to both the National Security Council and the DNI.
This framework includes some organizational shifts in the Intelligence Commu-
nity structure that would provide the DNI with a staff to run the Intelligence
Community.
Advocates of the DNI proposal argue that the current DCI is unduly
influenced by the CIA.62 The DNI, they argue, would bring more objectivity
to the intelligence process and would facilitate programmatic and resource
tradeoffs across agency lines. Furthermore, the DNI would have the advantage
58. See generally John Prados, Intelligence Community Leadership: Development and Debate Since
1947, at 37-52 (June 27, 1989) (study on file with Congressional Research Service).
59. See supra note 53.
60. S. 421, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
61. Id. § 3.
62. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 8, at 164-66.
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of being free from any bias created by allegiance to a single agency. Supporters
also assert that the demands of managing and directing the CIA detract from
the DCI's ability to advise the President and manage the Intelligence Communi-
ty.
The benefits generated from creating a DNI divested of management
responsibility for a single agency-in effect, an "Intelligence Czar"--would
fail to outweigh the potential diminution in the quality and responsiveness of
intelligence. The DCI currently draws on a wealth of substantive intelligence
support from the CIA. A DNI either would be removed from this support or
would have to replicate it through new sources. In addition, a DNI would
duplicate many of the intelligence functions performed by the National Security
Adviser, creating a potential for confusion and tension within both the Intelli-
gence Community and the national security policymaking apparatus. It is highly
probable that a DNI would eventually command the Intelligence Community
in name only. Thus, the creation of such a position would ill serve the Presi-
dent, the Congress, and the Intelligence Community. In fact, most DCI's have
opposed the creation of a DNI.63
2. Proposed Elements for Restructuring
A definitive reorganization framework cannot be proposed until the process
described in Part III.A is complete, and, more importantly, the bases on which
reorganization will proceed are clear. Even so, there are certain elements that
are important to consider in any restructuring plan.
As noted above, the DCI should continue to be the administrative head of
the CIA. In any reorganization, the CIA is likely to remain the primary focal
point for the kind of broad-based intelligence collection and analysis required
by policymakers, with the other Intelligence Community agencies having more
limited and focused roles. A direct role in the CIA's management and an ability
to draw on the CIA's substantive intelligence support will better enable the DCI
to serve as the President's primary intelligence adviser.
Given the evolving nature of intelligence requirements, Congress should
consider, however, including offices from other agencies within the Intelligence
Community, and hence, making them subject to the DCI's guidance and direc-
tion. For example, certain activities of the Department of Commerce and the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative have a direct bearing on the economic
issues that will likely receive increased intelligence emphasis. The Environmen-
63. The Carter Administration's support of the Charter Legislation would have resulted in a DNI-like
structure, but the DNI would have continued to manage the CIA. President's Carter's DCI, Stansfield Turner,
continues to support the DNI concept. See id. at 164-66. In 1978, each of Admiral Turner's two predeces-
sors, Richard Helms and George Bush, testified in opposition to the proposal. National Intelligence
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2525 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47,211-12 (1978). Based on discussions with former DCI's Richard Helms,
William Colby, and William Webster, I believe that each of them continues to oppose the DNI concept
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tal Protection Agency might merit inclusion as international environmental
issues grow in prominence from the standpoint of the Intelligence Community.
The DCI could coordinate these activities more effectively if these offices were
included in the Intelligence Community. Moreover, including the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) and the FBI's international counternarcotics and counter-
terrorism efforts within the Intelligence Community deserves consideration as
these law enforcement issues receive greater intelligence emphasis.'
One of the more significant challenges facing the DCI will be enhancing
coordination among Intelligence Community agencies-especially between
military and nonmilitary agencies. This issue was addressed in each of the
recent Senate and House authorization bill reports. Perhaps this is a logical (if
not inevitable) byproduct of the significantly larger intelligence budgets of the
1980's. In an era of abundant resources, redundancies within the Intelligence
Community were more easily tolerated; it was probably easier for an agency
to obtain appropriations to meet a perceived need than to convince another
agency to meet that same need. The 1990's, however, will require the President
and the DCI to insist on greater coordination and cooperation among the
Intelligence Community agencies as intelligence requirements increase but
budget resources shrink.
Most DCI's have found that the demands of the multifaceted position
require them to rely on the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) for
significant functions. Depending on the DDCI's experience, these delegated
duties may pertain primarily to managing the Intelligence Community or to
managing the CIA. In light of the sweeping changes in the Intelligence Commu-
nity, it would be worthwhile to consider reinstituting two DDCI's, a structure
that worked when President Bush was DCI in the mid-1970's. One DDCI could
then focus on assisting the DCI in his role as head of the CIA, in effect becom-
ing chief operating officer of the CIA. The other could focus on the DCI's
Intelligence Community responsibilities, assisting in the coordination and
resource allocation decisions that will be so important in the next decade.
If the two-DDCI structure is adopted, one of the Intelligence Community's
three top positions should be held by a current or retired military officer.
Current law prohibits both the DCI and the DDCI from being military offi-
cers.65 Since 1947, however, either the DCI or the DDCI position often has
been very effectively filled by an active duty or retired military officer. Espe-
cially with reduced Intelligence Community resources, the importance of
promoting cooperation between military intelligence components and the other
Intelligence Community agencies cannot be underestimated. Having a military
officer in a position of senior leadership within the Intelligence Community
64. Portions of the DEA are already included within the intelligence authorization bills for budget
purposes, and President Carter's Executive order included the DEA as a member of the Intelligence
Community. Exec. Order No. 12,036, supra note 10, § 1-15.
65. 50 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1988).
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might be an effective means to encourage such cooperation. Moreover, a
military officer serving as DCI or DDCI would promote cooperation between
the CIA and the military services even more effectively than would the military
Associate Deputy Director for Operations required by the SSCI authorization
bill report.
66
If the DCI is to ensure increased flexibility and reduce redundancy and
inefficiency within the entire Intelligence Community, additional powers should
also be considered. For example, the Carter Executive order endowed the DCI
with "full and exclusive authority" to approve the budgets of Intelligence
Community agencies.67 In effect, this language gave the DCI a trump over the
Secretary of Defense on Intelligence Community budget issues. This explicit
authority would enable the DCI to control Intelligence Community expenditures
more effectively. Similarly, the DCI's authority to establish intelligence collec-
tion requirements-currently phrased in terms of "establish[ing] mechanisms"
and "resolv[ing] conflicts" 6 -- should be redrafted in terms that give the DCI
more explicit authority to direct the collection activities of the various agencies
of the Intelligence Community. Other ways to enhance the DCI's authority also
merit consideration.
The possibility of switching the roles of the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense in the selection and direct supervision of the Directors of the NSA and
the DIA should also be considered. Currently, because both agencies are part
of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense plays the leading role
in the selection of the military officers to fill these two positions. This selection
is coordinated with the DCI, but often only after the selection is made. Howev-
er, both the NSA and the DIA conduct only intelligence-related activities.
Because the DCI is accountable for the performance of these agencies, the DCI
should also have a greater voice in selecting their directors.69
Finally, the analytical aspects of intelligence must play a part in any
restructuring proposal. Over the next decade, intelligence analysis is likely to
receive greater emphasis than in the past.70 In part, this reflects the increased
availability of overt information from what were, until recently, closed societ-
ies.71 This emphasis will also result from having the first career intelligence
analyst serve as DCI. As the Gates confirmation hearings made clear, however,
there is a longstanding concern that intelligence analysis be objective and not
66. See text accompanying note 43.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,036, supra note 10, § 1-602.
68. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 11, § 1.5(m).
69. Cf.., e.g., Turner, supra note 8, at 160. Turner argues that the DCI, not the Secretary of Defense,
should have the authority to "appoint and fire" the directors of the NSA and the "Satellite Reconnaissance
Agency," a fictional name Turner gives to the agency that operates all intelligence satellites.
70. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 8, at 51-52 ("The major change in intelligence as a result of the new
age of glasnost will be a final shift of the primary concentration of intelligence from collection to analysis.
'.. The new era will put [analysts] where they should be: at the center of the intelligence process.").
71. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 8, at 161.
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"politicized"--that intelligence analysis not be deliberately slanted to support
the views of the policymakers.
The Intelligence Community structure itself can create the appearance that
intelligence is being "politicized." For example, one of the reasons the Senate
Armed Services Committee opposes having the Director of DIA report to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence is to avoid "the risk of politicizing DIA intelligence support by
placing politically appointed officials in direct charge" of DIA operations and
analysis.72 Similar considerations argue for a structure that continues the
relative independence of the Intelligence Community from the control of
policymaking officials. In his confirmation hearings, Dr. Gates identified eight
principles that he intends to implement to ensure the objectivity of CIA intelli-
gence analysis.73 Any restructuring should extend these principles, as applica-
ble, to the other Intelligence Community agencies. Moreover, any restructuring
should also preserve the Intelligence Community's longstanding tradition of
filling most of its senior positions with career intelligence officers in order to
enhance the objectivity of the analysis being provided to the President, other
policymakers, and Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
The significant political changes taking place in the world require that
restructuring the U.S. Intelligence Community receives proper consideration.
At a minimum, this is necessary to ensure that the Intelligence Community
serve the interests of U.S. policymakers as they confront these global changes.
The President might, with some justification, assert that Intelligence Community
structure primarily concerns the executive branch and should not be the subject
of legislative concern. Congress, which has seen its role in intelligence policy
increase in the last fifteen years, would certainly challenge that assertion.
Both the President and the Congress, however, must actively participate
for Intelligence Community restructuring to be implemented and ultimately
successful. They must agree on the targets and priorities to be addressed by the
Intelligence Community. Once those issues are identified, the President should
propose a workable structure with sufficient flexibility to adapt to the concerns
72. See S. REP. No. 113, supra note 52, at 273.
73. The eight principles outlined by Gates were (1) stressing to all analysts the importance of integrity
and objectivity of the product and accepting divergent views; (2) asking for the restoration of collegiality
and civility that acknowledges that honest people can and will disagree; (3) including in the performance
evaluation of all managers how well they encouraged the principles of openness to alternative views; (4)
including the issue of integrity of analysis in every training course for analysts and managers; (5) encourag-
ing the SSCI and -PSCI to reestablish analysis and production subcommittees that focus on oversight of
the analytical process; (6) asking the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for its help and ideas;
(7) considering the creation of an analysis council of retired former senior officials; and (8) soliciting ideas
from analysts and managers on how to rebuild morale and ensure integrity and independence. Nomination
Hearings, supra note 9, at 2906.
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of future Presidents and executive branch policymakers. Congress may then
adopt or reject the President's proposal. If these steps are followed, the resulting
Intelligence Community structure is more likely to be the most effective and
efficient structure that our political system can produce.

